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On the Experience of Activity 
William James’s Late Metaphysics and the Influence 
of Nineteenth-Century French Spiritualism 
 
Jeremy Dunham (University of Durham) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Is it possible to have a first-person experience of our own agency? In nineteenth-century 
France, this question was subject to intense philosophical debate. The two figures primarily 
associated with each side of the debate were Maine de Biran (1766-1824) and Charles 
Renouvier (1815-1903). Biran developed powerful objections to Hume’s arguments that 
purported to prove the impossibility of the experience of one’s inner causal force. These 
objections formed the match that lit this philosophical fire, and resulted in Biran being 
recognized as the father of the spiritualist school of French philosophy; a school that 
included Félix Ravaisson (1813-1900), Jules Lachelier (1832-1918), Émile Boutroux (1845-
1921) and Henri Bergson (1859-1941). 1  Renouvier, who found Biran’s arguments 
unconvincing, developed an opposed school of philosophy that brought together 
pluralism, phenomenalism, and Kantianism. William James followed these debates from 
                                                        
1 Stebbing wrote that in Bergson’s philosophy ‘we see the continuation of the current of French thought 
that proceeds from Maine de Biran through Ravaisson and Boutroux. It would perhaps be hardly necessary 
to point this out—for no philosopher springs from the void—were it not that, to the English-speaking 
world at least, Bergson’s views came with such force of novelty that he seemed to have no roots in the 
past’ (1914: 35-36). Despite the existence of English language works on the ‘roots’ of Bergson’s philosophy 
(see Lovejoy, 1913, and Scharfstein, 1943), this perception of Bergson as having ‘no roots in the past’ 
among Anglo-American commentators has hardly changed (although, a recent (2018) article by Sinclair is a 
pleasing exception). In a discussion of Bergson’s theory of intuition, Moore (2012: 407) claims that 
Bergson’s own pronouncement that his theory is not original is ‘wild’ and that there is nothing else like it in 
the whole history of philosophy. Even scholars with better knowledge of the history of French philosophy 
overemphasize Bergson’s originality, see Moore (1996, xi).  
Is there a particular experience-type associated with the exercise of agency? 
This question was subject to lively philosophical debate in Nineteenth-Century 
France. William James paid close attention to these debates, and for most of 
his academic life argued that the answer was “no”. However, in this article, I 
show that a few years before the end of his life, under the influence of the 
French spiritualist tradition, he changed his mind. I argue that this change led 
to a global shift in his philosophical thinking. One major consequence of this 
is that he modified his philosophy so that it allowed a greater role for 
‘objective’ reality, and was consequently at less risk of the charge of ‘solipsism’ 
directed at him by his critics. After this shift, James’s philosophy could stand 
on much firmer ground.  
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across the Atlantic and, for the most part of his philosophical career (from at least 1885 to 
1905), associated himself with Renouvier’s neo-critical side. However, at some point 
between 1906 and 1908, James changed sides. James scholarship has been more or less 
silent on this shift. Perhaps because it seems like a slight modification—a minor change to 
his psychology. One of this article’s central aims is to show that such a judgment would be 
wrong. In fact, this change of mind led to a global shift in his thinking, and to major and—
most crucially—positive changes, not only to his psychology, but also to his metaphysics, 
and pragmatism.  
James was vocal about the developments to his metaphysics. In his A Pluralistic 
Universe lectures, he attributed the changes to his reading of Bergson’s 1907 L'Évolution 
créatrice and its critique of intellectualism (the belief that we can understand the underlying 
nature of the world by means of static intellectual concepts).2 This is because James had 
become concerned with the problem of how two different minds can come to know the 
same one thing. Over time, he realised that this was only a problem if one accepts 
intellectualism. Bergson provided him with good reasons not to do so. The critique of 
intellectualism, therefore, helped him to dissolve the problem. So far, James scholarship on 
the change to his late philosophy has focused on this critique, and on what this convinced 
James to reject.3 For this reason, commentators have underemphasised how radical the 
changes James made to his metaphysics in 1908 were,4 and many have even argued that 
his claim to have undergone a ‘Bergsonian conversion’ is overblown.5  
This article aims to show that if we focus not on what the problem of two minds 
seeing the same thing caused James to reject but rather on what the problem inspired him to 
accept, a different picture emerges. The problem inspired him to reject intellectualism, but 
                                                        
2 See PU 1909, 101-124 
3 See Bernstein, PU, xxiv; Moller 1997, 2001, and 2008; Sprigge 1993: 165-169; Taylor, 1996: 135-137.  
4 Moller (1997, 2001, and 2008) claims that there has been a radical change, but that the change is that after 
1908 James adopts a panpsychist position. However, I agree with Ford, (1982), Sprigge (1993), and 
Lamberth (1999) that he had taken up a panpsychist position from much earlier, so this cannot be the right 
story about the change. That James defended some form of panpsychism earlier than 1908 is clear in the 
Many and the One manuscript to which Moller makes explicit reference (See MEN 1903-4, 6). 
5 Ralph Perry played down the Bergson influence citing a statement from Bergson himself where he 
highlights (correctly) the significant difference between James’s understanding of the ‘stream of thought’ 
and his own ‘durée réelle’. Bergson writes that ‘the “Bergsonian” influence counts for nothing in the 
development of his philosophy’ (Bergson, 1905, cited in Perry 1935: 600). At the time when Bergson wrote 
this, he was right to make this claim. The “Bergsonian” influence comes later, and the influence pushes 
James away from his ‘stream of thought’ position to something closer to Bergson’s durée réelle. Bernstein 
(PU, 1997, v-xxxviv), Čapek (1950), Myers (1986), and Townsend (1997) also play down the importance of 
this change. Lamberth (1999: 182) refers to it as a mere ‘refinement’. Flournoy (1917: 198-206) and 
Stebbing (1914: 25-26, 37-38, and 123-124) carefully and perceptively point out some crucial differences 
between the metaphysics of the two philosophers. Boutroux (1912) thinks that James recognized that 
Bergson’s arguments ‘lend support’ to his already existing views.  
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this rejection must be understood in tandem with his acceptance of a claim that he had 
long denied: we can experience our own genuine activity, or causal agency. The reason why 
this change of mind was so important for James, I argue, is that it represents a crucial shift 
in his methodology, specifically in the way that he analyses experience. Once James 
changed his methodology, he recognised that significant changes to his philosophy had to 
follow. Since the conversion was underway before 1907, i.e., before the publication of 
L'Évolution créatrice, it is not quite right to call James’s conversion simply a ‘Bergsonian’ one 
(although his work was a significant factor). The arguments that James uses to express his 
acceptance of activity as a psychological and metaphysical principle have a heritage that go 
back to Biran. Therefore, we are better off calling James’s late change his ‘spiritualist’ 
conversion.     
My case will develop in four stages. First, I present the French debate over the 
first-person experience of causal force. I start with the arguments in its favour made by 
Biran. Then I address Renouvier and James’s objections and show them to be wanting. 
Second, I examine James’s earlier (pre-1906) understanding of experience, his 
phenomenenalism, and the methodology that led him to these objections. Third, I focus 
on what forced James to change his views and the arguments that he developed to make 
this shift palatable. I finish by showing how James’s final view of experience enabled him 
to allow a greater role for objective reality in his metaphysics and thus resist the charge of 
‘solipsism’ that had previously been levelled at his ‘radical empiricism’ by his critics.  
 
 
1. THE DEBATE OVER THE EXPERIENCE OF CAUSAL FORCE 
 
 
§1.1 
 
Maine de Biran published little in his own lifetime. It was only a decade after his death, 
when Victor Cousin started to publish significant portions of his work posthumously, that 
its depth and originality was recognized.6 Soon after his work appeared in print, Biran was 
recognised as the father of a new French spiritualist tradition. 7 The defence of causal force 
                                                        
6 [citation partially redacted for review]. Biran’s strong influence on nineteenth and twentieth-century 
French philosophy is clear. This is explicit in works such as include Bergson (1922), Boutroux (1874), 
Deleuze (1995), Ravaisson (1867), Tarde (1876), Merleau-Ponty (1968), Henry (1949), and Ricoeur (1950). 
7 There were two schools of spiritualism in nineteenth-century France. One, which is the focus of this 
essay, fathered by Maine de Biran and another which was aligned with the ‘eclecticism’ of Victor Cousin. 
‘Spiritualism’ in this article always refers to the Biranian school. On the relationship between these two 
forms of spiritualism, see Vermeren (1987 and 1995).  
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is the central doctrine of this spiritualist school. It is the basis from which the rest of their 
philosophies tends to be unpacked. Biran developed this defence in response to Hume’s 
denial of the experience of force or ‘necessary connexion’. In §VII of the Enquiry, Hume 
argues that there are three possible sources for our idea of force or necessary connection: 
first, external objects; second, reflection on the operation of our minds; and, third, divine 
power. The third is dismissed as a theoretical fairly-land. But, to undermine the possible 
testimony of the first two sources, he argues that through both we only ever experience 
distinct events, and that there is no conceivable circumstance upon which we could 
perceive the necessary connection between any two of them. When observing external 
objects, we do not observe a ‘power’ passed between objects (say from one billiard ball to 
another as the former strikes the latter). We only experience one event (ball a newly next 
to ball b) followed by a second event (ball b having moved position). Similarly, we do not 
experience our own power when a desire to move an arm is followed by the arm’s 
movement. We merely experience one event (the desire) followed by a second (the 
movement).  
According to Biran, the success of Hume’s argument was that it showed 
conclusively that we cannot obtain an idea of force from the evidence of external sense 
impressions; for this ‘Hume deserves our gratitude’ (OMB.VII.167). Nonetheless, Biran 
found Hume’s argument to be misguided when it is extended to the evidence of inner sense, 
i.e. what Hume had called internal reflection on the mind’s operations. Biran argued that 
the fundamental mistake of the empiricists (Hume, Locke, and Condillac) was to leave the 
analysis of inner sense incomplete and to confuse it with the outer senses. In contrast, he 
wanted to show that true reflection on inner sense shows its operations to be incomparable 
to those of the external senses. While the classical empiricists were right that external sense 
impressions are presented to us passively (i.e., without the volitional input of the mind), 
the same is not the case for inner sense. Our causal efficacy or activity, he argued, is a fact 
discoverable only through inner sense. This activity is most evident to us in the feeling of 
willed effort. Every time we clench our fists or lift a heavy weight, we have evidence of 
this activity. It is true that through the external senses we merely experience one event 
followed by another, but through inner sense we feel the activity of willing to lift the object 
through the strain that is concurrent with the desire.  
Charles Renouvier, and William James following him, objected to this inner sense 
‘proof’ of causal force. As Renouvier presented Biran’s proof, Biran attempted to show 
that ‘willed effort’ and ‘muscular sensation’ are perfectly connected in one and the same 
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act (ECG.II.i.261): as I lift a heavy weight, the feeling of muscular resistance reveals to me 
the causal force that I freely enact. Both Renouvier and James reject the proof for the same 
reasons. Renouvier presents a short critique in his 1854 Traité de psychologie rationnelle and 
James provides an expanded version backed up with experimental data in his 1880 ‘The 
Feeling of Effort’ (EPs 83-124).8 First, they argue that Biran has misconceived of what this 
so called ‘experience of willed effort’ is really an experience. For Biran, they suggest, this 
experience of muscular effort should be the necessary antecedent of the movement itself. 
It is the feeling of the free activity involved in lifting the object. However, Renouvier and 
James maintain, on the contrary, that this experience is rather the feeling caused by the 
muscular tension. ‘Muscular effort’, James writes, ‘is a sum of feelings in afferent nerve 
tracts, resulting from motion being effected’ not the condition of the effect (EPs 1880, 123). 
So rather than being antecedent to the movement, it is consequent to it. Second, although 
it is true that when I will to lift my laptop the action follows, there is not an immediate 
connection between the desired end and the action. Rather, there is a causal chain that the 
desire initiates. It is only the end itself that appears to consciousness. We have only the 
vaguest of experiences (if we have one at all) of the connections that lead from the desire 
to the achieved action. We can hardly say that our ‘feeling of effort’ gives us some idea of 
a causal force that is necessary for bringing this action into being, if we have only the most 
confused idea of the process itself (cf. PP 1890, 288 and BC 1892, 400).  
 
§1.2 
 
James and Renouvier’s objections to Biran’s introspective proof are forceful. It is 
surprising, therefore, to find that at the end of James’s life he appears to defend the 
Biranian position. In his posthumous Some Problems of Philosophy, he claims that our ‘will-
acts’ or ‘activity situations’ provide us with ‘perfectly comprehensible instances of causal 
agency’ (SPP 1911, 109). In 1909, he tells us that we obtain our understanding of causality, 
activity, efficacy from the ‘dramatic sense of something sustaining a felt purpose against 
felt obstacles, and overcoming or being overcome’ (PU 107). It is clear that a conversion 
has occurred. But why? To answer this, we need to know not only why he decided to 
accept something like the Biranian position, but also why he no longer thought that his 
and Renouvier’s arguments refuted it. In the rest of this section, I address the ‘road 
clearing’ problem (which involves showing why James might have finally seen his own 
arguments to be unsatisfactory), and I discuss the final acceptance of the position in §3. 
                                                        
8 For further historical context, see Smith (2011).  
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As discussed above, James’s arguments against Biran’s ‘proof’ depended on 
Renouvier’s reconstruction of it. However, in the first half of the nineteenth-century James 
started to engage more with the living proponents of the spiritualist tradition (Boutroux 
and Bergson in France, and James Ward in England) against which Renouvier had directed 
his attacks. Renouvier’s influence on James’s had been declining since the 90s (See CWJ 
VII 351), but this decline picked up speed in 1903 after Renouvier’s death. 9  This 
engagement with the spiritualist tradition must have led James to consider more carefully 
their central arguments. Biran was not the only target of James’s objections in ‘The Feeling 
of Effort’ and the Principles of Psychology. In fact, James was more concerned with closer 
contemporaries such as Alexander Bain, Hermann von Helmholtz, Ernst Mach, and 
Wilhelm Wundt. Renouvier’s reading of Biran allowed James to lump Biran amongst them. 
But after studying the works of the spiritualists themselves more carefully, James may have 
started to recognise that Renouvier’s presentation of Biran’s argument was in some sense 
a straw man. 10 Although Bain, Helmholtz, Mach, and Wundt do try to show that we get a 
feeling of effort from muscular sensation,11 Biran did not. When Biran’s arguments are 
studied more carefully, it is clear that he already has forceful responses to the kind of 
objections Renouvier and James established.   
Renouvier’s reconstruction was correct insofar as Biran believes that in the act of 
willing we experience our own causal activity. Biran tells us that it reveals to us our existence 
as a ‘hyper-organic force’ that is ontologically inseparable yet distinct from ‘organic 
resistance’. Although this ‘hyper-organic force’ is distinct from the body, it can only be 
realised in relation to it. Unless there is organic resistance, there is no hyper-organic force. 
They are only conceptually distinct.  
The first fault of the Renouvierian reconstruction is to suggest that this feeling of 
‘organic resistance’ is the feeling of muscular sensation. Biran had explicitly criticized such 
an argument as put forward earlier by the German philosopher Johann Jakob Engel (1741-
1802). In contrast to the version held by Engel and attributed to him by Renouvier, Biran 
makes a distinction not only between my body and the foreign body (e.g. a heavy box), but 
                                                        
9 See Girel (2007) 
10 To be fair to Renouvier, when he published his objections in 1854 the more detailed account of his 
argument that we can find in his Essai sur les fondements de la psychologie had not yet been published. This was 
first published in Ernst Naville’s 1859 collection of Biran’s works. Renouvier did not dedicate time to 
studying this later collection, and we do not find him adjusting his views in the later revised versions of his 
Essai de psychologie rationnelle. James also owned the earlier 1841 edition of Biran’s Oeuvres edited by Victor 
Cousin (See Houghton library, Harvard, WJ 653.41) rather than the 1859 edition. For reliable accounts of 
Maine de Biran’s philosophy, see Azouvi (1995), Frogneux (2005), Gouhier (1947), Meacham and Spadola 
(2016) Montebello (1994 and 2000), and Voutsinas (1975).  
11 See Bain (1864: 92), Helmholtz, (1867: 600), Mach (1886: 57), and Wundt (1876).  
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also between my body and the ‘hyper-organic force’ itself. In the experience of lifting a 
box, there are two essential distinctions: first, the distinction between my hyper-organic 
force which initiates the action and my body which resists my initiation according to its 
inertia (but nevertheless obeys my commands); and, second, the distinction between my 
body and the resistance of the box as a foreign body. Engel derives the experience of effort 
from the mediate feeling of muscular sensation resisting an exterior object. If the sensation 
were only experienced mediately, then Hume, Renouvier, and James would be right to 
suggest that since we lack knowledge of the material process, we cannot accurately attribute 
this sensation to a particular source. However, Biran argues that we do not experience a 
mediate feeling of effort, but rather an immediate one and it is only by recognising this vital 
fact that we can overcome Hume’s problem. The feeling of muscular strain would be only 
mediate because it would be the feeling of our body (body a) attempting to lift another body 
(body b: the box). But Biran claims that the feeling of the will is immediate because it is the 
feeling of moving one’s own body (body a). The resistance that interests Biran is the 
resistance of body a against one’s own will, not the pain body a receives from body b:  
 
[t]he true origin… of the idea that we attach to the word force, consists in the 
immediate power of the will to grasp and determine the inertial or resistant force proper 
to the muscular organs, and thereby to enter into a conflict of actions. According 
to M. Engel, it follows from the complication or from the conflict of our force 
with the alien exterior force, either that the latter is overcome, or that ours is 
momentarily suspended or as if paralysed by the object. In contrast, I believe that 
the muscular inertia is always surmounted, and the hyper-organic force, far from 
being relaxed or as if paralysed by this resistance, grows in energy and activity, to the 
degree that this resistance increases. (OMB.VII.169-70, my italics) 
 
According to Biran, therefore, Engel focused his attention on the wrong aspect of the 
phenomenology of lifting a heavy box. By focusing on muscular resistance, Engel is 
drawing attention to the feeling of our will being overcome rather than the feeling of the 
will itself. For Engel, the muscular sensation is still presented to us passively, in the same way 
as the impressions of our external senses are. We receive the sensation of muscular 
resistance (the pain body a receives from the weight of body b) in pretty much the same 
way as we receive the ideas of ‘green’ and ‘round’ from the perception of a ball. Biran’s 
critique of Engel’s proof, therefore, is the same as the Renouvier-James critique of Biran’s: 
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Engel has confused the feeling of muscular contraction with the feeling of the initiation of 
the action. But unlike James and Renouvier, Biran does not think that that is the end of 
the story. We do experience our volitional force, but to direct our attention to this force, 
we must no longer focus on these sensations as they are presented to us, but rather on 
experience itself as lived through.  
To grasp the above point, we need to understand what Biran understands by 
‘experience’. As Phemister (2004: 207) notes, empiricists like Hume and Locke understand 
experience as a noun: it is the thing that provides us with ideas, but it is the ideas themselves 
that are important. We have an experience. This experience (some combination of ideas) 
is followed by another experience (another combination), and so on. However, Biran is 
interested in experience not as a noun but as a verb in the active voice; it is experience 
itself as lived through rather than the ideas contained therein that he is interested in. We 
experience. This experience is a process that cannot be broken up into more basic blocks. In 
willed effort we do not merely receive impressions from muscular effort (although we do 
also receive these), but we also experience ourselves as active agents responsible for 
continually acting on an external body. Here ‘experience’ should be understood as a verb 
in the active voice because ‘we apperceive and reproduce it [through willed effort] at every 
instant’ (OMB.VII.121). Biran argues in the passage above that when we feel our muscles 
ache, but nonetheless continue to lift the heavy box, we do not feel our will being 
‘overcome’, rather we feel our will growing and increasing. This is because it requires greater 
continual mental effort to overcome the feeling of organic resistance. What we feel is the 
growth of our own ‘hyper-organic force’. While Engel focused his attention on the 
phenomenology of the sensation of muscular effort, Biran showed that we must focus our 
attention on our internal active experience. This is a shift from thinking of experience as 
the experience of atomistic chunks of ideas, to experience as active, continuous, and as the 
immediacy of our agency.   
 What do I mean by the ‘immediacy of our agency’? Recall Hume’s criticism of the 
claim that we experience internal force. Hume argued that if there were a necessary 
connection between the ‘movement of the arm’ and the conscious ‘willing the arm to 
move’, it would be impossible to have the latter without the former. However, since we 
know that an amputee can will to move their arm, even after their arm has been removed, 
such a necessary connection cannot exist. Biran responds that this confuses ‘desire’ with 
‘will’. Although a ‘desire’ is not necessarily fulfilled (in this case, the desire to move one’s 
arm), a ‘willing’ is. Biran argues that if the will does not bring with it a feeling of success, 
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there is no will at all. The relation between the will and its action is immediate. If I will to 
raise my arm, my arm rises. The initiation of the action and the achieved end are necessarily 
connected, and in the process of willing, I feel the immediacy of my agency. In other 
words, I know that this action is occurring (right now) only because I am willing it to be so 
(right now). It is not the case that I will the action, and then the end occurs, in two stages, 
rather the willing and the action are concurrent. Effect does not follow cause at a 
temporally later state; rather, they are fused together.  
But what about our amputee? There are two possibilities. First, if the amputee 
attempts to move their arm, forgetting that the operation has taken place, and moves only 
their residual limb, there is still the feeling of success, and thus, there is willed effort. It is a 
mistake in memory, not a mistake in feeling. Second, if there is no effect at all, no 
movement, not even in the residual limb, then while the amputee may have desired to 
move their arm, they did not will it so. Desires must be mediated by the will for an effect to 
take place, but in the experience of the will itself, the cause and the effect are compressed 
into an immediately felt indivisible duration.12 In cases of willing, the cause and the effect 
are inextricably linked. Therefore, examples that show that the desire and the end are not 
necessarily connected cannot be used to show that willing and end are not necessarily 
connected. 
The second criticism of Biran’s proof offered by both Renouvier and James (also 
originally made by Hume) was that if we really were able to observe a connection between 
our volitions and our corporeal movements, we would have to be intimately aware of the 
movements of the nerves and muscles responsible for the chain of events that leads from 
the volition to the arm’s movements. Biran believes that this line of attack follows from 
the misconceived assimilation of the inner and external senses. It is true that we do not 
observe this connection, but this is because it involves two heterogeneous kinds of 
knowledge. We experience the nerves and the muscles through our external senses, while 
the feeling of willed effort is an inner sense experience. The fact that we cannot represent 
these effects of external movement does not, he insists, prevent us from experiencing the 
feeling of our ‘primordial power’ or what he calls the ‘empire of the will over its organs’. 
He asks: 
 
What species of analogy is there between the representative knowledge of position, 
of the interplay and the functions of our organs, such as an anatomist or 
                                                        
12 See Hallie, (1959: 162) 
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physiologist can know them, and the inner feeling which corresponds to these 
functions, and also the internal knowledge of the parts localized in the continuous 
resistance of which we spoke previously? How could one not see the opposition 
that occurs between these two kinds of knowledge, an opposition such that at the 
very moment when the will moves an organ, if the instruments of motility could 
represent themselves instead of being felt, or be inwardly apperceived, the will 
could never arise? (OI.I.262)    
 
If we were able to observe all the internal actions and reactions inside the retina, we could 
not experience the colours. This is why the ‘hidden springs and principles’ are withdrawn 
from view of external senses. However, this does not mean that we have no feeling of 
power or causal force, but rather highlights the different forms of knowledge that are 
obtained through the external and the inner senses.  
 
 
 
2. JAMES ON EXPERIENCE: THE EARLIER VIEW 
 
 
Now that I have presented James’s objections to the experience of activity and the reasons 
why they fail to hit their mark, in this section I present the underlying philosophical 
methodology and worldview that supported these objections. Following this, in §3, I show 
why James realised that his methodology, and consequently, his philosophical system, had 
to change significantly.   
 
§2.1 
 
James publicly denied that we experience activity as late as 1905. At the end of his article 
‘The Experience of Activity’, James could not be clearer on his position:  
 
I have found myself more than once accused in print of being the assertor of a 
metaphysical principle of activity… I should like to say that such an interpretation 
of the pages I have published on effort and on will is absolutely foreign to what I 
meant to express. I owe all my doctrines on this subject to Renouvier; and 
Renouvier, as I understand him, is… an out and out phenomenist, a denier of 
‘forces’ in the most strenuous sense. (ERE 1905, 93n.10)  
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What is ‘out and out phenomenism’? Why does it lead to the denial of forces? Renouvier’s 
phenomenism is made up of two key claims. The first is epistemological: ‘Only phenomena 
exist for knowledge’. The second, metaphysical: ‘phenomena and their laws (which are also 
phenomena but constant or constantly assembled or reproduced phenomena) are reality 
itself’ (ECG.III.i.3). It is the second claim that differentiates Renouvier’s ‘out and out’ 
phenomenism from a standard epistemological phenomenalism. When Renouvier tells us 
that phenomena are reality itself, he is not defending a form of subjective idealism whereby 
all that exists is the phenomenal contents of our minds. Rather, he is presenting a 
panpsychist metaphysics according to which the fundamental nature of reality has the very 
same character as our phenomena: the in itself is for itself. Just as our own personal identity 
is constituted by a chain of phenomena proceeding ‘from next to next’ according to the 
laws of thought, so are all of the other beings in the world. Since the chain of phenomena 
that constitutes our personal identity is the only kind of existence that we have direct 
knowledge of, we can either postulate that we can have knowledge of the nature of reality 
(and thus that reality is throughout analogous to our phenomena) or deny that such 
knowledge is possible. Starting from the first position (from phenomena) is to start from 
what he calls ‘the point of view of knowledge’ (ECG.I.i.23).  
The point of view without knowledge is materialism or substance realism. This is 
because such positions regard our phenomena as inadequate, fleeting, or insufficient 
representations of the ‘really real’, which is either conceivable by a priori reasoning, or in 
Kant’s case, beyond the limits of possible experience. Whatever entities do really exist (be 
these material atoms or simply unknowable essences) are entities that we could never 
experience. On the contrary, Renouvier’s ‘point of view of knowledge’, regards the 
phenomena we experience as the really real itself. Given that philosophy and science 
require that we attempt to gain knowledge of the real, and the point of view without 
knowledge prohibits such a possibility, Renouvier believes that we have good practical 
reasons to choose the point of view of knowledge (ECG.II.ii.39-40). Importantly, however, 
the point of view of knowledge is a choice. Scepticism, he claimed, has taught us a valuable 
lesson. We cannot prove the existence of the external world, and we cannot prove that we 
are free—there is no indubitable evidence for either. However, scientific enquiry requires 
both. We must start by postulating that we are truly free, then freely choose to believe that 
there truly is an external world, and finally, assume that this external world is of a nature 
that we could comprehend, i.e., that it agrees with our phenomena. These are only articles 
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of faith, practical postulates, but ones, Renouvier argues, that are necessary to assume for 
the acquisition of any knowledge whatsoever, and therein lies their justification.  
Why does phenomenism lead to the denial of forces? To answer this question, it 
is first important to note that James was influenced by Renouvier’s analysis of phenomena 
partly because it offered a richer conception of experience than found in the works of the 
classical empiricists like Locke and Hume. Locke and Hume are interested in the ideas that 
make up an experience (the idea of green, round, etc., that make up my experience of a 
green plate), but they show little interest in the experience itself. The same is not true for 
Renouvier and James. They are genuinely interested in the character of the experience qua 
experience. James argued that the problem with the classical empiricist, or ‘associationist’, 
position is that it commits the ‘psychologist’s fallacy’. This fallacy occurs when one is asked 
to explain a thought and one answers not by discussing the thought itself but rather what 
the thought is about. So if the thought is about my laptop on the table, the fallacy is to 
imagine that our thought is composed of a laptop part and a table part that somehow 
compose together. However, James is a mereological nihilist, which means that he does not 
believe that parts can of themselves compose. They can only appear as composed to an 
observer. ‘In physical nature,’ he maintains, ‘it is universally agreed, [that] a multitude of 
facts always remain the multitude they were and appear as one fact only when a mind 
comes upon the scene and so views them’ (EP 1895, 71). For James, it would be a logical 
contradiction, and out of step with ‘the principles of corpuscular or mechanical science’, 
for something to be both ‘one’ and at the same time ‘many’ (PP 1890, 179; BC 1892, 397). 
What is ‘one’ is by definition is not ‘many’, and vice versa. We might think that the 
combination of hydrogen and oxygen atoms into water is a good example of why James is 
obviously wrong about this. These atoms combine to make water and in that sense they 
are both one (water) and many (hydrogen and oxygen atoms). However, James denies that 
these do in fact form a ‘one’ at all except for the perceiver or for that upon which the 
atoms act. He writes:  
 
Let it not be objected that H2 and O combine of themselves into “water,” and 
thenceforward exhibit new properties. They do not. The “water” is just the old 
atoms in the new position, H-O-H; the “new properties” are just their combined 
effects, when in this position, upon external media, such as our sense-organs and 
the various reagents on which water may exert its properties and be known. (PP 
1890, 161) 
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The atoms remain atoms, but if they group together they cause different effects for those 
bodies with which they come into contact. They can dissolve sugar or make an animal wet. 
However, if there is no sugar or animal to experience it, there is no water. The esse of the 
water (or of any composite) est percipi (EP 1895, 72).  
James believes that just as the parts of H2O do not combine into a new entity water, 
ideas do not combine together either. The taste of lemonade, for example, is not the taste 
of sugar plus the taste of lemon; it is a wholly different psychic fact that cannot be divided 
into the sum of its parts (EP 1895, 87n.15). My laptop and the table on which it sits do not 
form parts of my experience, but serve as occasions for the production of a wholly 
indivisible unit or pulse of experience. For the psychologist, therefore, the entire thought is the 
minimum fact with which they should deal. Each thought contains not just its unique 
object, but relations, tendencies, and duration. It is these crucial characteristics that are 
inextricably involved in the colouring of our experience that the classical empiricists 
ignored.    
Although they are armed with a richer conception of experience than the classical 
empiricists, both are as keen to restrict their speculations to that which can be found within 
it. Part of James’s concern with the defence of the feeling of effort in his early works is 
that this feeling was supposed to be a feeling of our interaction—beyond the 
phenomena—with the physical world, and thus provides us with direct evidence of an 
external world (PP 121). Like Renouvier, James believed that external reality could only be 
postulated as an article of faith. It is something that we can believe in but not prove.  To 
the question: what is ‘our warrant for calling anything reality?’ He answered: ‘The only 
reply is—the faith of the psychologist, critic, or inquirer’ (MT 1885, 16). Muscular 
sensation does not give us a direct experience of ‘force’ or the ‘physical world’, but rather 
‘reveals to us hardness and pressure… [as the other senses] do colour, taste, smell, sonority, 
and the other attributes of the phenomenal world. To the naïve consciousness all these 
attributes are equally objective. To the critical all equally subjective’ (EPs 1880, 121).  
Not only does the defence of the feeling of effort give us a false account of the 
reports of these sensations, James thought that it relies on a false account of the 
phenomenology of willing too. He thought that it entailed the view that ideas in themselves 
have no causal effect on the physical world, but must be initiated by means of some extra 
‘willing-force’, produced by the agent, that passes the effect from the idea in the inner 
world to the body in the outer one. On the contrary, James argues that all of our ideas are 
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‘impulsive’, and that any representation of a movement will lead to the body moving in 
that way unless another idea or representation conflicts with it. ‘Every pulse of feeling we 
have’, he claims, ‘is the correlate of some neural activity that is already on its way to instigate a 
movement’. We do not need to ‘will’ an idea into action. Unless there is a conflicting idea, 
action will follow from it successfully (PP 1890, 1134; BC 1892, 367). When we will 
ourselves out of bed on a cold morning, it is not that we have somehow transmitted 
enough force into our body so that it is able to emerge from the pleasurable warmth into 
the pain of the cold day. Rather, it is that we have managed to keep the idea of the cold 
day out of our mind for long enough so that the ideas of the day’s necessities could take 
precedence:  
 
‘A fortunate lapse of consciousness occurs… we fall into some revery connected 
with the day’s life, in the course of which the idea flashes across us, “Hollo! I must 
lie here no longer”—an idea which at that lucky instant awakens no contradictory 
or paralyzing suggestions, and consequently produces immediately its appropriate 
motor effects.’  
 
Once that has happened, we ‘suddenly find that we have got up’ (EPs 1888: 220).  
James’s conclusion from this phenomenological description is that willing is the 
ability to maintain our attention on one idea to the exclusion of others. If we want to get 
up, what we need to do is focus our attention on the idea of the importance of getting out 
of bed, so as the exclude the alternatives. If we focus our attention on this idea strongly 
enough, the requisite motor effects will follow. ‘The whole drama’, he concludes ‘is a 
mental drama’ (PP 1168). Willing itself is a process purely accountable in terms of 
phenomena. What our will, our moral life, ‘mental spontaneity’, and ‘subjective energy’ 
boils down to, therefore, is this ability to sustain the intellectual effort necessary to focus on 
one idea over others. This is what James calls our ‘active self’ or the ‘spiritual Me’ (PP 
1890, 285; BC 1892 163). Nonetheless, despite accepting that ‘there is a feeling of mental 
spontaneity’, James also doubts that our introspection of the feeling of intellectual effort 
provides us with a clear proof of its existence (EPs 1880, 115). He confesses that 
‘[w]henever I try to become sensible of my thinking activity as such, what I catch is some 
bodily fact, an impression coming from my brow, or head, or throat, or nose’ (BC 1892, 
300; cf. PP 1890 287-288). The ‘feeling’ of this intellectual effort is also characterised by 
the reports of bodily sensations, rather than some form of inner causality. However, unlike 
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the feeling of effort supposed to evidence mind to body causation, he does not think that 
we would be wrong to believe in intellectual effort. Like Renouvier, he thinks that although 
the willing we feel when we ‘strain’ to keep our attention on one thing rather than another 
is not a ‘sensibly given fact’, as only reports of bodily movements are sensibly given, it is 
still legitimate to ‘postulate’ that this is the free activity of our will (BC 1892, 400). This is 
why he famously says that the ‘first act of free-will, in short, would naturally be to believe 
in free-will’ (PP 1890, 948). It is one of the reasons why Renouvier was such a key figure 
for James. He offered him a way to stick to the phenomena and criticise the philosophers 
of effort on those grounds, but without, at the same time, having to deny that activity or 
free will have a role in our mental life.13   
 
§2.2 
 
For Renouvier and James, our consciousness is constituted of a series of ‘pulses’ 
(indecomposable unities) of experience that come into consciousness, die away, and are 
then replaced by another.14 Furthermore, as stated above, Renouvier (and also James) 
thought that this was not just true of our experience, but of reality itself. Renouvier argued 
that ‘the world, so far as real, is like an immense pulsation composed of a number 
(unassignable though at all times determinate) of concerted elementary pulsations of 
different grades’ (ECR, 1893, 441). James referred to this position, using Peirce’s 
terminology, as ‘tychism’ (the doctrine that there is novelty in the world), but much to 
Peirce’s irritation, it was tychism without synechism (the doctrine that there is continuity 
in the world).15 Since James and Renouvier regard each new moment as the replacement of 
the previous one, they cannot hold on to the doctrine of continuity (the past moment does 
not live on in the present in a metaphysical sense).  
So far, James and Renouvier agree. There is, however, a key point on which they 
disagree. Like Hume, Renouvier believes that we are conscious of the passage from one 
experiential state to the next, but not the immanent relation between these states. 
                                                        
13 In this respect, Renouvier stands in sharp contrast to Hippolyte Taine who used the arguments for the 
denial of the feeling of effort as part of a rejection of activity tout court and the affirmation of a Spinozist 
universal determinism (see Taine 1870: 479-480). I would like to thank an anonymous referee for bringing 
this to my attention.  
14 ‘Each pulse of cognitive consciousness, each Thought’, James writes ‘dies away and is replaced by 
another’ (PP1 1890, 322; cf. CWJ XII 1909, 278). ‘The stream of C[onsciousness] view assumes… that new 
fields of C[onsciousness] are punctually forthcoming to replace old ones’ (MEN 1906, 109). 
15 See CWJ VIII 1897, 243-246 and CWJ X 1903, 180-182 
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Thoughts, or phenomena, move from ‘next to next’ due to empirically discoverable laws, 
and not due to any transitive connection between these thoughts. Renouvier argues that 
we experience external but not internal relations, or using terminology borrowed from 
James, we experience only disjunctive relations (one state immediately followed by the 
next) and not conjunctive relations (the transitory relation between the two states). In 
contrast, James argues that our ‘stream of consciousness’ is like a ‘bird’s life’ and thus made 
up of both ‘flights’ and ‘perchings’ (PP I 236). The perchings are the resting places in the 
stream of consciousness, the ‘substantive parts’ or ‘phenomena’ recognised by Renouvier. 
But James argues that we must also admit the existence of the ‘flights’, the ‘transitive parts’, 
or the conjunctive relations between phenomena. After reading 1884 James’s defence of 
such relations (see EPs 142-167), Renouvier objected that such a defence leads to the 
affirmation of ‘the infinite’ in psychology. Instead of having a determinate number of finite 
elements of conscious life, we would have an infinite blob where everything collapses into 
each other. Renouvier was opposed to the theory of the infinite because he believed that 
it leads to mysticism and irrationalism (see ECS II 372-376). However, James is opposed 
to the idea that we can, because of intellectual reasons, deny the existence of something of 
which we have empirical evidence. Because Renouvier did not stick as strictly to the 
empirical as James would like, James later accused him of ‘scholasticism’ (SPP 1911, 85). 
Empiricism, James argued, should be a doctrine that admits only the data of experience, 
but, in addition, it must also take care not to exclude any data given by experience. When we 
reflect on our inner experience ‘our fields of consciousness seem to run continuously into 
one another’ (MEN 1903-4, 32). And when we reflect on our personal histories we 
recognise that they are ‘processes of change in time, and the change itself is one of the things 
immediately experienced’ (ERE 1904, 25). The problem with classical empiricism (and 
Renouvier’s philosophy) is that it ignores this experience of conjunction. Radical empiricism 
is radical precisely because it refuses to exclude this crucial datum. 
Renouvier’s denial of conjunctive relations means, James argues, that ultimately his 
system turns out to be ‘so much dust’ (CWJ VII 1892, 351). This is because it is a world 
of individual parts (discrete elements of phenomena) without a metaphysical glue to put 
these parts together. James thanked Renouvier’s ‘masterly advocacy of pluralism’ for 
freeing him from the ‘monistic superstition’ (SPP 1911, 4 and 85), but just as the monist 
has to answer the question ‘how then do we account for the disjunctive?’, i.e., disunity, the 
pluralist has to answer ‘how then do we account for the conjunctive?, i.e., the unity or the 
togetherness. According to James, it is because of the weakness of classical empiricism to 
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account for this unity that Kant introduced the transcendental ego and Hegel introduced 
the Absolute. These acted as the ‘beddings’ for the individual but unrelated pieces of the 
mosaic (the ‘perfectly definite elementary mental states’ (TT 21)). The strength of radical 
empiricism is that instead of having to postulate such non-experienceable entities (the 
Absolute or the transcendental ego) in order to account for the bedding, it is rather ‘as if 
the pieces clung together by their edges, the transitions experienced between them forming 
their cement’ (ERE 1904, 42).   
If Renouvier’s neo-critical position differs from James’s insofar as it recognises, to 
return to James’s bird metaphor, only perchings and no flights, we might follow Bergson in 
saying that the spiritualist position differs from James’s because it recognises only flights (M 
1923, 1418). As Bergson wrote to James, ‘I see places of flight in the resting-places themselves, 
rendered apparently immobile by the fixed gaze of consciousness’ (M 1903, 580: KW 357). 
However, Čapek (1950) and more recently Girel (2011) have warned against reading 
James’s ‘stream of consciousness’ view through what they see as Bergson’s distorting lens. 
James’s ‘resting places’ are not supposed to be immobile timeless elements joined together 
by places of flight, as the passage from Bergson might suggest, but rather they too have a 
certain duration. The resting places are merely ‘periods of comparative rest’. Čapek and 
Girel are right to emphasise this point. As James himself puts it, the difference is merely 
in the ‘rate of change’. When the rate is slow ‘we are aware of the object of our thought in 
a comparatively restful and stable way’, but when it is rapid ‘we are aware of a passage, a 
relation, a transition from it, or between it and something else’ (PP1 1890, 236; cf. 573). 
Indeed, in James’s chapter on the perception of time, he tells us that the minimum block 
of conscious experience is always a ‘duration-block’, a unit of duration that is usually a few 
seconds long16 (PP I 1890, 570-576)17. However, after correctly stressing the mobile nature 
of James’s resting places, both Čapek and Girel underemphasise the real difference that 
there is between James and Bergson. On the one hand, Čapek claims that when we 
understand the resting-places as themselves ‘in flight’, Bergson also defends the existence 
of both. He tells us that for Bergson duration is ‘a droplike succession of temporal wholes’ 
(1950: 336). Bergson, therefore, is much more Jamesean, than he suggests. Girel, on the 
other, makes James more Bergsonian than Bergson suggests. For Girel’s James the 
                                                        
16 In fact, on at least one occasion, James suggests that it is the ‘purely transitive’ flights that occupy ‘no 
time’ (MEN 1905, 70).  
17 (cf. PBC 245-246) 
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‘current’ of the stream of thought—the flight—is the primary reality, and the substantive 
parts—the resting places—are such only by means of abstraction.   
The truth, however, is that Bergson’s rejection of ‘resting-places’ does point to an 
important distinction between James’s and the spiritualist understanding of experience. It 
is also a difference that follows from the kind of introspective methodology used by James, 
on the one hand, and the spiritualists, on the other. To claim that Bergson sees duration 
as a ‘droplike succession of temporal wholes’ is to undermine the radical nature of his 
views. Bergson’s duration is a pure continuous flux without breaks. Sure, when we reflect 
on time we cannot help but think of it except in terms of temporal wholes, but, as Bergson 
proclaims, ‘we do not think real time. But we live it’ (CE 53). When we ‘live through’ real 
time, we experience it as pure becoming. This is not a time that could in any real sense be 
broken up into ‘beads’ that are somehow measurable in clock-time. Crucially, for Bergson, 
it is the pure flux of duration that is absolute reality, while the temporal wholes are mere, 
albeit practically useful, abstractions. In James’s philosophy, in contrast, clock-measurable 
‘duration blocks’ are the really real. Blocks that are certainly joined together seamlessly, but 
there is no suspicion that these duration blocks—the relative resting places—are in any 
sense less real than the flights. 
The methodological distinction between James and Bergson is that James does not 
discuss ‘intuiting’ real lived time. For the James of the 1890 Principles of Psychology ‘the law 
of time’s discrete flow’ is the ‘composition out of units of duration’ (PP I 1890, 585). Bergson, 
following Biran, has moved from the perspective of experience as a noun to experience in 
the active voice, experience not as presented to but as lived through. Any ‘psychical state’, he 
writes ‘can only be separated and constituted into a ‘state’ by an effort of abstraction or of 
analysis’. (IM 31) States are the ‘already-made’, but intuition, by turning us away from the 
faculty of ‘seeing’ towards the faculty of ‘willing’, enables us to focus on the ‘being made’ 
(CE 238; 259). Biran’s influence is clear: we are turning away from the evidence of the 
‘external senses’, and focusing on inner sense, because it is via inner sense that we can 
understand our experience as an activity, as a verb in the active voice, as ‘continual flux’.18 
In this continual flux, we do not experience one discrete moment pass by and which is 
then replaced by another, although this is how we must understand it when we reflect 
upon it, but a pure continuity where every moment extends into every other. James, before 
1908, hasn’t made the requisite methodological shift to understand experience in this way. 
James is still answering the question ‘what do we get when we try to observe an experience?’ 
                                                        
18 On the relationship between Bergson and Biran, see Bergson (1922), Janicaud (1997), and Lefève (2003)  
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This is evident in the fact that he is still thinking of experiences as units. Bergson would 
agree that he has got the right answer to that question, but insist that James is asking the 
wrong question. 
One might base an objection to my claim on James’s understanding of ‘pure 
experience’. Prima facie there are parallels between duration, on the one hand, and what 
James calls ‘pure experience’, on the other. In brief, ‘pure experience’ is the primary matter 
out of which all else is formed; ‘[t]here is no stuff but pure experience-stuff’ (ERE 1904, 
31). Unlike actual experience, pure experience is neither conscious nor material but 
potentially or dispositionally either (MEN 1903-4, 26-7), and becomes one or the other (or 
both) by means of its relations to other pure experiences. Pure experience is also only 
experienceable in states where our conceptual categories are not readily available to cast it 
within their net. He tells us that ‘new-born babies, or men in semicoma from sleep, drugs, 
illnesses…’ may have a ‘pure experience’ because they are having an experience without a 
definite what. (In other words, they are having an experience that has not been captured 
conceptually). Whatever this somewhat mysterious ‘pure experience’ stuff is, it seems to 
exist at the future fringe of our present experience, and is moulded into its consequent 
conceptual form by means of its relations with antecedent experiences.  
There is a major difference between these two doctrines, however. For Bergson, 
in the intuition of duration, we access reality in an absolute sense. Intuition reveals to us a 
reality that is prior to the reality of perceptual experience insofar as the latter cuts up and 
abstracts from this fecund basis. Duration is reality as it really is and from which we make 
practically necessary abstractions; it is where the action really is. However, pure experience 
just does not have this relevance for James. In a revealing note written circa 1905 on 
James’s copy of Bergson’s Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, James wrote ‘I, in 
my way of dealing with pure experience, should say that the pure bits of durée [duration, 
but for James, pure experience]… are germs and that the developed ‘objects’ which they change 
into, including among these the notion of a time succession of all things, even of 
themselves, are truer and supersede them’.19The point James is making here is that his ‘pure 
experiences’, the pure bits of duration, are not what is most important to him. The 
important elements are in fact what these ‘pure bits’ develop into. The final developed 
thoughts are not ‘less true’; rather, more so. A pure experience is only the germ of reality, 
not reality itself. This is the polar opposite view to Bergson’s (and to James’s later one).  
 
                                                        
19 Ref WJ 607.75 at the Houghton library, Harvard 
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3. THE EXPERIENCE OF ACTIVITY 
 
 
In 1904, James returned to the problem of the feeling of effort for his president’s address 
to the American Psychological Association (ERE 1905: 17-96). There he claims that 
despite the important work done by philosopher-psychologists, such as Bergson, G.F. 
Stout, and James Ward—thinkers whose work on activity he will explicitly align himself 
with after 1907 (see SPP 1911, 110)—his sympathies are still with Renouvier (ERE 
1905n.10). For the empiricist, radical or not, our experience of activity can do no more 
than ‘record the fact that the strain is sustained’ (ERE 1905, 87). What we call ‘activity’ is 
what he calls a ‘conjunctive’ or ‘synthetic’ object, a relation ‘experienced between bits of 
experience already made’. It is a kind of remembrance of a succession of thoughts; only 
the ‘superficial sign’ of the activity felt’. Therefore, it can tell us nothing of the source of 
this activity. What we feel to be activity is in fact the record of this succession having taken 
place, not the feeling of ourselves putting it into action (ERE 1905, 88).20  
One thing that is clear in the presidential address is that James remains wedded to 
a false dichotomy: either (i) stick to empiricism and thus to what is revealed in an 
experience; or, (ii) defend a metaphysical active force beyond the phenomena and thus 
gives up on one’s empiricist credentials altogether. However, sometime in 1906-7, James 
realises that there is a third option and finally decides that he had been wrong about the 
experience of activity. We have already addressed one reason why he might come to realise 
this: he treated the arguments for this kind of experience unfairly. However, we also need 
                                                        
20 A referee has asked me: if ‘The Experience of Activity’ expresses the same view as James held in ‘The 
Feeling of Effort’ and the Principles, then why does he include the work as an appendix to the post-
conversion A Pluralistic Universe?’ This is a very good question. I think that the answer to this is that 
although the position on whether or not the experience of mind to body activity is simply a record of 
bodily activity is crucial to this present discussion, it forms a relatively minor part of the presidential 
address. James’s main aim is analytical and pragmatist. He shows just how many types of question are 
involved in understanding the experience of activity, sketches a way to think about whether or not one is 
the true cause of an action in terms of the pragmatic method, and suggests that further speculation on 
activity might lead to a panpsychist view of the world. All of this is presented in a fairly inconclusive way. 
Even when James investigates what the pragmatic consequences might be for where we locate the 
experience of activity, none of the options he considers (that the true actor is the absolute, competing 
ideas, or nerve cells), are the one that should truly be of interest to him: that I am the true actor. He 
highlights how different the pragmatic results might be, and thus the importance of the investigation, but 
concludes that ‘I cannot even hint at any solution of the pragmatic issue’ (ERE 1905, 91). Nonetheless, all 
of this preparatory work remains very useful for thinking about these issues, even when James changed his 
mind on the issue under the microscope in this current article. A further reason why he might not felt the 
need to alter the text is that he is clear in the A Pluralistic Universe lectures themselves that he has undergone 
a conversion since the time of the article’s original publication (see PU 94, 107, and 116-119).  
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to understand why he was motivated to reopen his investigation into this problem and to 
consider these arguments anew.  
We can find the reason in a notebook that James kept between 1905 and 1908 now 
known as the ‘Miller-Bode Objections’ (MEN 63-130).21 In this notebook, James wrestles 
with the problem of ‘how two minds can know the same thing’. Dickinson Sergeant Miller 
and Boyd Henry Bode (1905) had objected to James that this question could not be 
answered by his ‘radical empiricist’ conception of experience. Bode wrote that radical 
empiricism ‘does not account for our awareness of a world beyond our individual 
experience; and it also fails to show how there can be a world that is common to a 
multiplicity of individuals’ (1905: 133). Why so? The reason why it fails to account for how 
we can be aware of a world beyond our experience follows from James’s mereological 
nihilism. The merelological nihilism underlying James’s radical empiricism means that it 
must implicitly hold that the composite objects that we experience are not, strictly 
speaking, out there in the world itself. So when I perceive a pen on a table, this perception 
of the pen is not a duplicate or representation of the pen outside of me; it is the pen. James 
maintains that ‘object and subject fuse in the fact of ‘presentation; or sense-perception—
the pen and hand which I now see writing, for example, are the physical realities which those 
words designate.’ (MT 1905, 73 my italics). There is no pen outside of me, just ‘molecules 
and what not’ (MEN 1906, 106). These molecules in no way form parts of the perception. 
They cannot because if the pen were truly a pen outside of me, and at the same time its 
constituent molecules, it would mean that the pen was ‘one’ and also ‘many’. Something, as 
we have seen, that James takes to be logically contradictory. Consequently, ‘knowledge of 
the percept is not the effect of the object it is the object’ (MEN 1906, 108). However, if the 
esse of this pen is its percipi by me, how can I say that I have any knowledge of that which is 
not percipi by me?  
Ultimately, James was less concerned by this problem than he was by the second: 
how there can be a world that is common to a multiplicity of individuals? This is because 
he believed that any adequate philosophy must be able to account for the ‘togetherness of 
things’. A world in which it is impossible for any two people to know the same thing is 
clearly not a world of ‘togetherness’. The problem is that such togetherness seems 
prohibited due to James’s rejection of the composition of consciousness. As James writes 
in the notebook:  
 
                                                        
21 First so-called by Perry (1935: 750-762).  
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In my psychology I contended that each field of consciousness is entitatively a unit, 
and that its parts are only different cognitive relations which it may possess with 
different contexts. (MEN 1905, 65) 
 
But how can two minds know the same thing unless ‘an identical part can help to constitute 
two fields’? 
 
Bode & Miller both pick up the contradiction. The fields are not then entitative 
units. They are decomposable into “parts”, one of which at least is common to 
both, and my whole tirade against “composition” in the psychology is belied by 
my own subsequent doctrine! (MEN 1905, 65) 
 
If, as is the case according to James’s radical empiricism, our knowledge of the pen is the 
pen, and the pen that I perceive is not in any way ‘composed’ of parts outside of my 
perception of the pen, then two people cannot see the ‘same’ pen. For the pen that I see 
will be the pen that I see in virtue of being the pen that I see. Its esse is its being perceived by 
me. In contrast, the pen that you see will be the pen that you see in virtue of it being the pen 
that you see. Its esse, in contrast, is its being perceived by you. Since my pen and your pen 
contain no common parts, (they are not composed of molecules and what not), the different 
percipients result in different esses. Therefore, they are different pens: ‘pen co-my mind can’t 
be the same as pen co-your-mind’ (MEN 1906, 101). 
On September 12th 1906, he started to wonder whether the whole problem might 
be due to the very acceptance of the terms of intellectualism. The problem that Miller and 
Bode impose on him may in fact result from the fact that he is using ‘logical and statical 
categories’ for ‘what is really a living and dynamic situation’. ‘Didn’t I’, he asks,  
stick to “pen,” “me,” & “you,” and the relations “co” and “ex,” in a purely static 
manner? Did n’t I leave them as so much flat “content,” immediately given, and, 
as such, fixed for the time being? (MEN 1906, 104) 
In this notebook entry, James is beginning to become critically aware of the introspective 
methodology he is using—one that analyses experiences strictly as they are presented to us—
and of its limitations. He notes that in his radical empiricist philosophy, he has not just 
been treating the experiences themselves as nouns, but also the relations themselves: ‘the 
conjunctive relations, as I have talked of them so far, are inactive’ (MEN 104). This means 
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that radical empiricism had ignored the processes by which the experiences themselves 
‘come to pass’ (MEN 105). He realises that he had been limiting himself to showing that 
certain experiential facts exist, but ignoring the causal processes through which they come 
to exist in the first place (MEN 106).  
The obstruction in the way of focusing on these causal processes is James’s long-
held belief that we do not experience our own activity. However, as we have seen, the obstruction 
in the way of recognising that we experience activity is his methodology for analysing 
experience. The recognition of causal forces thus requires that he take on a new 
philosophical methodology. And this is exactly what he realises. The solution will arise, 
James says, if will treat the elements of the problem from ‘the dynamic point of view’ 
(MEN 106):  
 
Would n’t [sic] the remedy lie in making activity a part of the content itself, 
reintroducing agents, but not leaving them behind the scenes? Vivify the 
mechanism of change! Make certain parts of experience do work on other parts! 
Since work gets undeniably done, and “we” feel as if “we” were doing bits of it, 
why, for Heaven’s sake, throw away that naïf impression, and banish all the agency 
and machinery into the region of the unknowable, leaving the foreground filled 
with nothing but inactive contents?  
 
Why does this help? By February 1908, James had worked the answer out. If the problem 
is set out in terms of a ‘static’ logic – that is in terms of the ‘static’ singular experiences we 
find if we analyse experience as a noun – then, I can only perceive my pen, and you only your 
pen. However, if we understand reality in a dynamic sense, even the ‘instantaneous 
constitution of reality’ will be active and changing. The solution is to be found, James told 
his audience later that year during the Pluralistic Universe lectures, if you ‘place yourself at a 
bound, or d’emblée, as M. Bergson says, inside of the living, moving active thickness of the 
real’; if you ‘place yourself at the point of view of the thing’s interior doing’ (PU 1909, 116-
117). Here James is clear that we must analyse experience as a verb, that is as lived through not 
presented to. This is because from this point of view we will recognise that the ‘my pen’ that I 
perceive is not one self-same logical bit of stuff but a dynamic changing process. This 
means that:  
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when you say it is anything, it obliges you also to say not only that it is more and 
other than that thing, but that it is not that thing, both the is and the is not implying 
at bottom only that our grammatical forms, condemned as they are to staticality 
and alternation, are inadequate, if we use them as literal substitutes for reality. 
(MEN 1908, 123) 
 
What we perceive is not a static identical subject, but rather, as Bergson argues, a 
‘manyness-in-oneness’. ‘At bottom’, James writes, we must consider ‘the constitution of 
being as activity, neither stark sameness nor stark otherness’ (MEN 1908, 129). An active 
being is a being that becomes what it is not but at the same time remains what it is. As 
Biran claimed, activity grows and increases. However, if we have a direct experience of 
something being what it is and what it is not (without stopping to be what it is), and 
James—now convinced by the French spiritualists’ analysis of experience—believes we 
do, then it is intellectualism that is at fault and which must be rejected. Life, for James, has 
priority over logic. Previously, our pen was not only a different pen as perceived by me 
and as perceived by you—it had a different esse in each case, dependent as the esse is on 
percipi—but also a different pen at every moment. If things cannot compose then this 
means that the new pen cannot really endure into the next moment, because then the pen 
at t2 would include pen at t1 as a composite part. However, our experience of activity shows 
that there is continuation from one moment to the next—we do not have the emergence 
of the radically new at every moment, rather the past lives on into the present. Even if logically 
we cannot define an individual without paradox, through such an experience we can 
understand it by ‘awakening sympathy’ with it. An individual is what James calls an active 
continuum, and we can understand what active continua are like, because we are active 
continua and we know this through intuition. For example, as I life a weight in the air, I 
become what I was not, but I do this without ceasing to be what I was; through the lifting 
of the weight, I feel my past persisting into the present through the growth of the feeling 
of activity. In the same way the pen that exists at t2 might be something that the pen 
existing at t1 was not (for a start, pen at t1 did not exist at t2, yet), but at the same time as 
being something new, it remains the pen that existed at t1. ‘Thus, to sum up’, James writes:   
 
mental facts can… compound themselves, if you take them concretely and livingly, 
as possessed of various functions. They can count variously, figure in different 
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constellations, without ceasing to be “themselves”—understanding by a self not a 
stark same nor a stark other.’ (MEN 1908, 129) 
 
James’s metaphysical position, therefore, has changed fundamentally. As I stated in §2, 
James called his radical empiricist metaphysics ‘tychism’ (the doctrine of real novelty), but 
tychism without ‘synechism’ (the doctrine of continuity). However, now James has 
recognized, as Peirce had been trying to convince him for years, that synechism cannot be 
given up. As James wrote to Bergson in 1907:  
 
whereas I have hitherto found no better way of defending tychism than by 
affirming the spontaneous addition of discrete elements of being (or their 
subtraction), thereby playing the game with intellectualist weapons, you set things 
straight at a single stroke by your fundamental conception of the continuously 
creative nature of reality. (CWJ XI 377)  
 
Previously, James’s philosophy was a philosophy of the present moment (albeit a moment 
that had its own duration). However, after this conversion, his universe is really growing 
(SPP 1911, 29 &108). By this he means that the amount of being in the world is really 
increasing. He admits that how this could be the case is a problem that is one of the ‘darkest 
in all philosophy’ (SPP 1911, 30), but this is, nonetheless, what intuition shows to be the 
case. Perception, he says in the 1911 Some Problems of Philosophy, just as he did in the 1890 
Principles of Psychology, ‘changes pulsewise’, but—and here is where the latter text differs 
from the former—‘the pulses continue each other and melt their bounds’ (SPP 1911, 32 my 
italics). The ‘pulses’ of experience no longer replace each other, but now melt into each other.  
There is, however, more to the change of his understanding of experience than 
this. Insofar as James is now able to analyse experience as a verb and not a noun, he 
recognizes, as Biran did before him, that the feeling of activity is a feeling of our causal 
interaction with the world. Previously, James’s theory of experience was always one step 
removed from the world: we perceived our pen, but beyond this perceived pen exist only 
molecules or mind-stuff. This presented him with some serious problems. If the in itself of 
the pen is not in any sense part of my experience or your experience, then how can we be 
said to know the pen? However, he now argues that our ‘concrete perception of causality’ 
or our ‘feeling of activity’ is revealed to us in what we ‘live through’ (SPP 1911, 106). What 
we ‘live through’ are the feelings of will and triumph, of ‘obstruction, striving, strain or 
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release. They are what he now calls the ‘ultimate qualia… of the life give us to be known’ 
(SPP 1911, 107). Experience is activity, and activity requires passivity, i.e. it requires 
interaction with another. It requires the real interaction between mind and world. This is 
why he tells us that ‘[t]he concept ‘reality’, which we restore to immediate perception, is 
no new conceptual creation, but a kind of practical relation to our Will, perceptively 
experienced’ (SPP 1911, 60). In sum, reality is not a creation of what James called conception 
(understanding, intellection), and it is no longer a mere practical postulate, but rather an 
immediate experience, what he called perception (Bergsonian intuition, or that out of which 
concepts are constructed).  
Now we have all of the pieces together ready to give a final answer to the question 
that had plagued James: how can two minds know the same thing? By means of 
understanding experience as lived through (as a verb), rather than as presented to (as a noun), 
James recognised that we experience ourselves as an active continuum, something that 
continued to be what it is even as it turns into what it was not. Therefore, what I was 
continues to be part of what it is that I have come to be, and what I have come to be is a 
‘compound’ of the old and the new. I am one and many. Since we have direct experience 
of the fact, it must be the case that the supposed logical incompatibility of the ‘one’ and 
the ‘many’ cannot be taken to have any force when it comes to metaphysical matters. 
Furthermore, since what we have experience of is experience of ourselves as active agents, 
and what it is to be an active agent is to be an interactive agent, this means that what we are 
and what we become is itself a product of our interactions with others. I interact with both 
Joe and Jess, and these interactions are formative in what I am to become, but at the same 
time Joe and Jess both interact with the same me. Similarly, both Joe and I interact with the 
same Jess, and Jess and I the same Joe. Of course, it is the case that the way I perceive Jess 
will be different to the way Joe perceives her, because both of our experiences will 
inextricably be affected by our own emotional responses, aesthetic preferences, memories, 
and other subjective factors, but, nonetheless, we will end up agreeing on key structural 
features, because we both interact with the same objective reality: Jess’s esse is more than 
percipi. Jess qua Jess is a real ingredient of both mine and Joe’s experiences. An individual is 
now, James says, a ‘business centre’, since it is ‘alive enough to carry on more than one 
business’ (MEN 1908, 128). It is ‘centre of reference and action’ that can radiate in many 
directions. It ‘can turn inside of itself—which means that without ceasing to be itself, it can 
stand in many relations, of which being with the “rest” is only one’ (MEN 1908, 128). 
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4. CONCLUSION  
 
 
I have argued that James’s change of mind about whether we are able to experience our 
activity followed from a change in his methodology. Although he defended a form of 
phenomenalism for most of his academic life, he finally gave up on the phenomenalist 
method around 1906. This meant that he gave up on trying to analyse experience as 
passively presented to us, and begun to analyse it as we live through it. Although Bergson 
was one of the important causes of this shift, the can be traced all the way back to the 
father of spiritualism Maine de Biran. The consequences of this change in methodology 
for his philosophy are far too numerous to discuss in an article. Changes must occur to his 
metaphysics (his understanding of the nature of reality and causality, as we have discussed, 
but also to his understanding of time and personal identity), and also to his psychology 
(most explicitly his understanding of the stream of consciousness). Furthermore, it has 
considerable ramifications for our understanding of his place in the pragmatist tradition 
more generally. Although James is sometimes accused of excessive subjectivism,22 his 
response to the Miller-Bode objections shows just how important it was for him to attempt 
to make room for objective reality within his philosophy. James did not live long enough 
to detail the full ramifications of this shift of position would be for the rest of his 
philosophy, and it would take considerable reconstructive work for a scholar to do this job 
themselves. Nonetheless, as the debates concerning the ongoing relevance of the work of 
the classical pragmatists for contemporary philosophy continue to be extremely 
productive, I believe that such reconstructive work would be most fruitful.23   
  
                                                        
22 See Moore (1908) and Misak (2013)  
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the University of Sheffield ‘Pragmatism and the Analytic-Continental Split’ conference, the Manchester 
Metropolitan University ‘French Spiritualism and its Critics’ conference, and a University of Durham 
Work-in-Progress session and Departmental Seminar. The research for this article was partially funded by a 
University of Sheffield/Leverhulme Early Career Research Fellowship. 
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